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Introduction

Much of the economic analysis of conflict relies on game theory as an analytical tool. 1 When elements of control theory are integrated into a classical non-cooperative game, we obtain a di erential game (Lewin 1994 ). These models are of high interest, but fraught with two problems: first, the resulting systems of di erential equations frequently do not a ord an analytical solution , in particular if the equations of motion contain nonlinearities (Beckmann und Reimer 2014) . Second, the calculations involved are so complex that it is hardly credible that real-world decision-makers would employ them at all. In the absence of repetition and learning, it is di cult to rationalise how agents could "feel their way" towards equilibrium. 2 In the present paper, I address both of these problems by suggesting a boundedly rational heuristic for deciding in a di erential game. This heuristic was used in Frey and Rohner (2007) as well as in Beckmann and Reimer (2014) , but has not to my knowledge been analysed as general decision rule. As we will see in section 2, this heuristic also avoids the infinite utility problems that would ensue in an infinitely repeated game with no discounting.
I suggest that this decision rule is intuitively plausible and also simplifies both the calculations required of the agents and the resulting di erential equations describing the behaviour of the system in such a way that analytical solutions can become available. This paper is organised as follows: The next section 2 sets out the idea for a simple decision heuristic and demonstrates how this would work in an infinite repetition of a simple stage game. Section 3 generalises the idea to di erential games (with state variables) and considers two classical examples, the political business cycle and a rentseeking game, to illustrate the usefulness of our approach. Section 4 concludes.
Basic approach
Consider a game with two agents i oe {1, 2}, each of whom has a compact set of pure strategies S i . Denote strategy choices by ‡ i and payo s by fi i ( ‡ i , ‡ j ) where j is the Applications where optimal solutions are sought in order to program them into a computer, as in the pursuit-evasion models (Isaacs 1965) , are a di erent matter altogether.
"other" player. The first order condition for an optimal choice given ‡ 2 is the obviousˆfi
From the above, one can compute player i's reaction function by solving for ‡ i and then find the Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution of the system of the two reaction functions.
We now consider a simple dynamic version of the above game: strategy choices are made over a (possibly endless) interval of time t oe [0; T ]. At each point in time, an identical version of the stage game is played; that is, the state of the system does not change as a consequence of agents' choices (an assumption we will relax in the next section). Let us use this simple scenario to posit a simple heuristic and explore its properties.
The decision heuristic
At any point of time, agent i takes j's current strategy ‡ j as given (as in the Nash conjecture) and as time invariant -that is, agents are assumed to be myopic. We then assume the agent to calculate the optimal static response according to equation (2.1) and close a proportion -i of the gap between this myopic optimum and its current strategy ‡ i (t). The equation of motion for i's control is given bẏ
In addition to being myopic, this heuristic has two important properties:
1. Choices have a history, in particular, there is an exogenous starting strategy ‡(0). This can reflect such things as initial readiness or deployment in a theory of conflict.
2. Agents can di er in their speed of adaptation to the current myopic optimum. This property can be used to model di ering speeds of decision-making processes or di erent flexibilities in implementing policy changes. 
Convergence to Nash equilibrium
Denote i's the reaction function as
We write d ij as a shorthand forˆ2
. Obviously, from the second order conditions for a maximum, we have d 11 < 0 and d 22 < 0, and the sign of the mixed partials depends on whether there is strategic complementarity or substitutability. Using (2.4), the Jacobian of our system is
The eigenvalues of this Jacobian are given by
Note that the reaction speeds -i are non-negative. If the mixed partials have the same sign -i.e., if the game is weakly symmetric in the sense that the complementarity or otherwise of stategies is the same for both players -, then the eigenvalues will both be real-valued and no oscillations can occur. If the reaction speeds are identical, then
is a su cient stability condition in the sense that both eigenvalues will be real-valued and negative. The typical di erential game model di ers from the above game in that the players' instantaneous utility or payo depends on the current value x(t) of a state variableor a vector of such variables -, while the change of the system state is a function of the system's history and the players' strategies or controls. Formally we have
We can translate this into the format of equation (2.1) by integration. Notice that
i's payo at time t is therefore a function of the history of play and of the initial condition of the system x 0 . We can still apply the heuristic represented by equation (2.2): players are assumed to treat the current state of the system x(t) and their opponent's current strategies as given, calculate their optimal response in this static setting and then close a percentage -between the "best" response and their current strategy ‡ i . The di erence between the di erential game and the repeated static game of the previous section is that the desired end state is now a moving target -the process no longer converges to the NE of the stage game, but to the NE of a static game described by the system's state at termination x(T ). (If time is infinite, the target can continue moving indefinitely.) 5 3 Di erential games
First example: the political business cycle
We now consider a simple application of our approach: the classical political business cycle model (Drazen 2000) . There are two players, the government and the private sector. Let the short-run trade-o between unemployment u(t) and inflation p(t) be given by the simple Phillips curve
where p represents the actual rate of inflation -the government's control -and p E is the expected rate of inflation, controlled by the private sector. The government is assumed to minimise a quadratic loss function defined over the two bads inflation and unemployment:
where Ÿ is an exogenous weight increasing in the government's leftiness. As in the literature, we assume that the private sector's goal is to minimise the squared forecast error (p(t) ≠ p E (t)) 2 . The usual specification of adaptive expectations can be dropped because it is built into our behavioural assumptions as long as -< 1.
As for the private sector, its optimal choice at each point of time (given a static reference) is obvious: it is to set p E (t) = p(t). However, only a proportion -of this gap can be closed. This yields the equation of motioṅ
As for the government, we plug equation (3.3) into equation (3.4) to get
The myopically optimal response is therefore
3 Di erential games which yields the following equation of motion (assuming for simplicity that the -s are the same):ṗ
These equations of motion can be studied in the usual way. First, we letṗ E =ṗ = 0 to find the steady state p Eú = p ú = Ÿ◊. We then compute the eingenvalues of the Jabobian
, both of which are real-valued and at least one of which is negative.The steady state will therefore be either stable or saddle point stable (if the signs di er).
Second example: a dynamic rent-seeking model
The second example extends the well-known basic model of rent-seeking (or, alternatively, wasteful military conflict) to a dynamic setting (Rowley, Tollison and Tullock 2013) . Assume we have two agents vying for resources. At every point of time, agent i has r i (t) units of the resource pool under her control, which she can either invest into some productive activity or spend on fighting f . Denote the constant rate of return for peaceful production fl > 1. The pool of resources that is up for grabs at time t is then fl q j (r j ≠ f J ), and we assume that agent i receives a share p i according to the standard contest success function (Hirshleifer 2001 
In our bounded rationality model, agent i will choose f i in such a way as to maximise this net gain of resources. The first-order condition for this problem simplifies to:
For the remainder of this example, let us focus on the two-agent case. Using (3.6), we find that both agents aspire to realise f 1,2 = 3 8 (r 1 + r 2 ). We therefore have the following equations of motion for the controls:
As the state and control variables di er in this model, the dynamics of the model come from a system of four ordinary di erential equations -(3.5) and (3.7) -, half of which are non-linear. The nonlinearities lead to the usual kind of problems when attempting to solve the system explicitly.
In order to solve the equation system for a steady state, observe that we must have f 1 , f 2 " = 0 due to (3.5). From (3.7), we conclude that the r i s must also be nonzero. We proceed to proove the nonexistence of a steady state in three steps.
1. Consider a symmetric steady state with f 1 = f 2 = f > 0. We can then subtract the two versions of (3.5) to find that r 1 = r 2 = r. Substitute into (3.7) to find f = 3 4 r. Plugging this into (3.5), we find r(fl ≠ 3 8 fl ≠ 1) = 0, which implies that either r = 0 -which would lead to a contradiction -or fl = 1 1≠3/8 and r free. 2. In any solution, we can add the two equations (3.5) to find, after some rearranging, that (fl≠1)(r 1 +r 2 ) = fl(f 1 +f 2 ). Using (3.7), this in turn implies (fl≠1)(r 1 +r 2 ) = fl 3 4 (r 1 + r 2 ) or fl = 4. 3. Finally, our first (symmetric) version is a special case of the second, and so the second argument must apply to the first case also. However, fl cannot simulataneously be equal to 4 and 1.6. Consequently, not steady state with nonzero values for r i and f i exists.
Consequently, numerical techniques must be used to explore the properties of this model. Figure 1 below shows a simulation model of equations (3.5) and (3.7) set up using Stella. 3 It is easy to explore this model and to find that the typical results are not very sensitive to one's choice of parameter values. . We see that fighting intensifies in the beginning as the parties try to acquire the existing resources, but then decreases again as resources are depleted. Production fails to keep up with resource use for fighting, and the typical PD-type ine ciencies of rent-seeking models are clearly evident. In our model, all resources will be used up in the end. The system asymptotically approaches the origin (f 1 = f 2 = r 1 = r 2 = 0) without ever reaching it.
Conclusion
The present paper has shown how a boundedly rational heuristic can be used to simplify di erential games. The basic assumptions resemble adaptive expectations as they were used in early dynamic models in the 1950s, and are admittedly rather simple. In contrast to these older models, they do contain an element of optimisation, and represent may be considered the "other extreme" when compared to the highly complicated calculations involved in solving di erenctial games (if that is at all possible in a technical sense).
I presented to examples spanning the gamut of applications both regarding subject matter and our ability to solve the resulting system of ODEs. In the macroeconomic example, a steady states existed and its stability properties were amenable to analytical scrutiny. In the conflict / micro example, no steady states existed, and so simulation was used to describe the system's behaviour over time. However, in both examples we were able to state analytical equations of motion for the controls, which is more than can be said of many di erential games with non-linearities.
